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The topic of this Symposium is the American Law Institute's Re-
porters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury.'
Published in April, 1991, the Reporters' Study assesses the Ameri-
can tort system a quarter-century after the appearance of the ALI's
Restatement (Second) of Torts. During that interval, there has been
a revolution in American personal injury law. The two most striking
developments have been the adoption of strict products liability by
courts and the enactment of no-fault automobile compensation plans
by legislatures. William Prosser wrote in 1971 that the judicial crea-
tion of strict products liability represented "the most rapid and alto-
gether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire
history of the law of torts."2 Courts have dramatically expanded the
availability of compensation not only in products cases but through-
out the tort system.3 On the legislative front, a development of equal
dimension was the enactment, beginning in 1970, of no-fault auto-
mobile compensation plans in many states.4 No-fault advocates such
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as Jeffrey O'Connell have urged since the 1970s that the successes of
automobile no-fault indicated that it was time to turn "to more am-
bitious legislation' 5 to extend its benefits beyond the auto accident.
Academic studies played an important role in the movement to-
ward auto no-fault plans and strict products liability. The auto
no-fault movement can be traced to the landmark 1932 Columbia
Report," the product of a three-year study of the problem posed by
automobile accidents, conducted largely by Columbia and Yale Uni-
versity scholars. That report rejected the dominant view of the time
that fault was a satisfactory criterion for compensation. Rather, the
Columbia Report viewed automobile accidents as "inevitable" and
proposed a "plan of compensation, analogous to workmen's compen-
sation [which] would eliminate the principle of fault and through a
requirement of insurance and the use of a statutory scale of benefits
would make it reasonably certain that all persons with appreciable
injuries would receive some compensation."17 The authors supported
their legal and policy analysis with data developed in empirical stud-
ies on the automobile accident problem.8 In 1959, Fleming James
wrote that the Columbia Report was "the most significant contribu-
tion to the study of torts to appear so far in the twentieth century.",,
Despite the approval of scholars such as James, the idea of a com-
pensation plan for automobile accidents languished until a new wave
of academic studies coincided with the consumer movement led by
Ralph Nader to draw attention to the automobile accident prob-
lem.1 " In 1964, Alfred Conard and his colleagues unveiled an ex-
haustive analysis of the economic treatment of automobile injuries.'
The following year, Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell published
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim.' 2 The Keeton-O'Connell
plan became the model for reform, as some form of no-fault auto
insurance gained legislative acceptance in twenty-four states between
1970 and 1975.1'
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An academic study also played a central, though different, role in
the judicial acceptance of strict products liability. That study, con-
ducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s under the auspices of the
American Law Institute, produced the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, whose Reporter was William Prosser. Early advocacy of strict
products liability came, however, from more traditional legal schol-
arship - most notably Karl Llewellyn's 1930 casebook on sales
1 4
and Justice Roger Traynor's 1944 concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.15 Like the auto compensation plan idea, the
proposal for strict products liability languished for decades. In the
early 1960s, however, it was given new life by landmark holdings of
the New Jersey and California Supreme Courts in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc."6 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.17 While these decisions sparked the strict products liability
revolution, its success was arguably assured by the ALI's approval of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) in 1965.18 With the pres-
tige of the ALI behind it, the doctrine of strict products liability
swiftly swept the country, with many courts simply "adopting" sec-
tion 402A, as if it were a statute.19
We recall the pivotal role played by these academic studies to sug-
gest that, if the past is a guide, the 1991 ALl Reporters' Study is
likely to be a focal point for scholars and reformers and may well
serve as a guide for judges and legislators. Professor Stephen
Sugarman already has commended the Study as "an important con-
tribution to torts scholarship," with "an unbelievably dazzling range
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17, 22 n.13 (1986) (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING
ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERI-
ENCE (1985)).
14. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 340-41
(1930).
15. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-67, 150 P.2d 436, 440-
43 (1944). In a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled Understanding Enterprise Liabil-
ity, we demonstrate that strict products liability shares a common heritage with no-fault
compensation plans. Our account, which also demonstrates that damages reform is an
integral part of that heritage, thus questions Professor Priest's widely accepted account
of the history of enterprise liability. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). See also Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981).
16. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
17. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
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19. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 180 (1989).
of issues . . surveyed and intelligently commented upon in a well-
organized way."' 20 And Judge Jack Weinstein has said the Study is
"destined to be the baseline for judicial and legislative activity for
years to come."
2'
Conceived in 1986 in response to a widely-held perception of a tort
and insurance crisis, the Study is the product of a five-year collabo-
ration by fourteen scholars.22 Unlike the ALI's Restatement of
Torts, the Study does not seek to be a "restatement" of the common
law of torts. Instead, the Study analyzes and evaluates key issues of
tort law within the context of "the broader array of social institu-
tions that seek to prevent and to compensate personal injuries: no-
fault liability systems such as workers' compensation, private and
public loss insurance for medical expenses or lost earnings, competi-
tive markets, and the various forms of administrative regulation of
health and safety. '2 3 It confines itself to personal injuries that "arise
out of product use, medical treatment, the workplace, and toxic ex-
posures in the environment, '24 the sources of "high-stakes" litigation
that many claimed led to a tort crisis in the mid-1980s.25
The Study's recommendations are both provocative and diverse.
With respect to the judicially created doctrine of strict products lia-
bility, for example, the Study repudiates the policies of victim com-
pensation and loss spreading 26 that have dominated judicial
lawmaking.27 While the Study would retain strict liability for manu-
facturing defects, it calls for a more restrictive approach in design
defect cases.28 It concludes that there "should be no separate 'con-
sumer expectations' test for design defects, nor any reference in this
inquiry to the superior capacity of manufacturers to serve as insurers
for product injuries. '29 It also urges a risk-utility test of defective-
ness more restrictive than that developed by some courts.30 The
Study proposes that "a product design should be held defective only
if there was a feasible alternative design which would have avoided
the injury in question without materially altering the consumer's ex-
pected use and enjoyment of the product, and then only if the costs
20. Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1208
(1992).
21. ALI Releases Study on Products, Mass Torts; Controversy Brews over Pro-
cess, Substance, Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 477 (Apr. 26, 1991).
22. See 1 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at xvii-xix.
23. Id. at xviii.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 9. Thus, the Study does not focus on automobile accidents, although it
recognizes that these "comprise the bulk of present-day tort litigation." Id. at 8.
26. 2 id. at 81.
27. See Ursin, supra note 15, at 302 n.470.
28. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 81.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id.
[VOL 30: 213, 1993] Foreword
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
of incorporating this new precaution in the design do not outweigh
the human and financial harms from the injuries thereby preventa-
ble."31 These recommendations can be seen as following the ALI tra-
dition of "restating" the law, since the Study argues that "courts
should explicitly recognize that they are employing a de facto negli-
gence standard in this area . ,,. Like Prosser's "restatement" of
products liability in section 402A of the Restatement (Second), the
Study, in effect, urges courts to join what it sees as a trend.33 Unlike
Prosser's trend, however, the contemporary trend is seen as cutting
back on the scope of products liability as a vehicle for victim com-
pensation. Thus the Study's "restatement" might be dubbed the Re-
trenchment (First) of Products Liability.4
The diversity of the Study's recommendations is apparent when
one turns from its treatment of products liability to that of medical
accidents. Far from disparaging the goal of victim compensation, the
Study here attempts to breathe new life into the idea of no-fault
patient compensation for medical accidents.3 5 Premised on a goal of
victim compensation independent of the carelessness of doctors or
nurses,3 6 proposals for medical no-fault surfaced in the early 1970s
in the midst of the surge of enactments of no-fault auto plans.37 The
Study notes, however, that "the no-fault idea was a non-starter in
the medical area," with the "first major objection [being] that it
would be too expensive .... ,,8 To meet this objection, the Study
develops a medical no-fault plan with a cost that would not exceed
31. Id. The Study also proposes alterations in the approach to warning issues
which could "reduce the role of courts and juries in making case by case adjudications of
warning adequacy" and would "increase the role of the federal government in creating a
viable hazard warning system." Id. at 57.
32. Id. at 16.
33. 1 id. at 5; 2 id. at 16.
34. For more expansive judicial approaches see Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.
3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (two-prong test for design defect);
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (rejecting state of the
art defense). The California and New Jersey Supreme Courts may have joined in the
retrenchment. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 33 Cal. 3d 987, 810
P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991) (risk must be known or knowable in a warning
case); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (restricting Beshada
"to the circumstances giving rise to its holding").
35. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 487-516 (elective no-fault medical liability). In
addition to its no-fault proposal, the Study proposes that tort liability should be shifted
from physicians to hospitals or other health care institutions in order to relieve doctors of
the direct financial burden of malpractice insurance. Id. at 488.
36. See id. at 492.
37. See id. at 488-89.
38. Id. at 489, 492.
that of the current malpractice system. Its emphasis would be on
compensation of "the catastrophic losses of the few people who [are]
most seriously injured rather than . the losses of the much larger
number of people who are only moderately harmed." 3 Recognizing
that policy makers will likely be "reluctant to shift suddenly to this
new form of liability," the Study endorses "at least as an intermedi-
ate step . . . Jeffrey O'Connell's idea of elective no-fault as a possi-
ble way to bring this new liability approach on stream. ' 40 Under this
approach, legislation would authorize hospitals and other health care
organizations to opt for no-fault in return for an exemption from
common law tort liability. Thus, in the area of medical accidents, the
Reporters' Study can be analogized to the 1932 Columbia Report
and its recommendation that tort be displaced in auto accidents by a
compensation plan. Coming in the midst of widespread concern
about health care in general and medical malpractice in particular,
the Study could spark a new debate over no-fault alternatives to tort,
comparable to the debate inspired by the Keeton-O'Connell plan in
the 1960s.
The Study also contains important, and likely to be controversial,
recommendations for the reform of damages law.41 The Study states
that "the law relating to tort damages has generated greater legiti-
mate concerns than have the underlying standards of substantive lia-
bility."'42 In particular, the "current open-ended process of jury
damage determination produces awards that are customarily unpre-
dictable, occasionally far too large (and sometimes too small), and
that channel disproportionate sums into payment for nonpecuniary
injuries such as pain and suffering, as well as into punitive dam-
ages."43 While the Study's damages reform recommendations oper-
ate within the existing regime of liability rules and would not entail
the sweeping change of the medical no-fault proposal, they neverthe-
less call for fundamental change.44 The Study recommends restric-
tions on pain and suffering and punitive damages, alteration (but not
elimination) of joint and several liability, and an almost complete
reversal of the collateral source rule. To balance these proposals,
which would significantly cut back on the right to victim compensa-
tion afforded under existing law, the Study proposes that successful
plaintiffs (but not defendants) be awarded reasonable attorney fees,
subject to restrictions involving the refusal of settlement offers.
39. Id. at 494.
40. Id. at 513 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 159-316 (tort damages).
42. Id. at 10.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 19-24.
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While the products liability, medical no-fault, and damages pro-
posals represent only a fraction of the many diverse reforms sug-
gested by the Study,45 they illustrate the range and importance of its
recommendations. They also are the principal focus of the distin-
guished scholars who contribute their commentaries on the Report-
ers' Study to this Symposium. Following this Foreword Professor
Marshall S. Shapo, the Reporter for a major 1984 American Bar
Association study of the tort system,46 opens the Symposium with an
article focusing on the treatment of product defects and warnings by
the Reporters' Study.47 At the close of the Symposium Professor
Shapo also contributes a rejoinder which addresses more general
themes.48 Professor Jerry J. Phillips, author of numerous works on
products liability and tort law,4" examines the Study's approach to
products liability and assesses its damages reform proposals. 50 In
contrast to Professors Shapo and Phillips, who are critical of aspects
of the Study that tend to restrict victims' rights to compensation,
Victor E. Schwartz, who chaired the federal government's 1976 In-
teragency Task Force on Product Liability51 and authored the model
Uniform Product Liability Act,52 joins co-author Mark A. Behrens
to generally commend the Study's proposed restrictions on punitive
damages.53 Professor Alfred F. Conard, author of the previously
mentioned 1964 study of the automobile accident problem, 5 assesses
the implications of the fact that innocent consumers, workers, the
45. The Study, for example, also offers suggestions on how the legal system might
better handle the complex scientific-legal problems arising in the context of toxic envi-
ronmental exposures and other mass tort litigation, and it suggests a no-fault approach
not only for future mass exposure disasters of the dimensions of the asbestos episode, but
also for injuries caused by prescription drugs. Id. at 319.
46. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM: TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY (1984).
47. Marshall S. Shapo, An ALI Report Markets a Defective Product: Errors at
Retail and Wholesale, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221 (1993).
48. Marshall S. Shapo, Rejoinder: Advances in the Analysis, 30 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 365 (1993).
49. See, e.g., JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW (1991); JERRY J. PHILLIPS,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1993); Dix W. NOEL & JERRY J. PHILLIPS,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES AND MATERIALS (1976).
50. Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters' Study of Enterprise Responsi-
bility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241 (1993).
51. FINAL REPORT, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY (National
Technical Information Service - Report No. 273-220).
52. 44 Fed. Reg. 62714-50 (1979).
53. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The American Law Institute's Re-
porters' Study on Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury: A Timely Call for Punitive
Damages Reform, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 263 (1993).
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
public in general, and investors (or investors' constituents) actually
bear a large share of damages awards. 55 Finally, Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell, whose pioneering work spurred the modern no-fault
movement, 56 and co-author Chad M. Oldfather sharply criticize the
Study for not going further to promote an aggressive agenda of no-
fault alternatives to tort.17 Following these commentaries, three of
the ALI Reporters - Kenneth S. Abraham, Robert L. Rabin and
Chief Reporter Paul C. Weiler - offer their reflections on the Study
and the commentaries."8 Following Professor Shapo's rejoinder, the
San Diego Law Review presents an overview of the analysis and rec-
ommendations of the Study, drawn from the Reporters' Study
itself.59
55. Alfred F. Conard, Who Pays in the End for Injury Compensation? Reflections
on Wealth Transfers from the Innocent, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 283 (1993).
56. See supra notes 4, 5, 13 and accompanying text.
57. Jeffrey O'Connell & Chad M. Oldfather, A Lost Opportunity: A Review of the
American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 307 (1993).
58. Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury:
Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 333 (1993).
59. The American Law Institute's Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibility
for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 371 (1993).
